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Abstract 
This article examines the public authority of chiefs’ courts within the United Nations Mission 
in South Sudan (UNMISS) Protection of Civilians Sites (PoCs). After December 2013, UNMISS 
peacekeepers opened the gates of their bases to around 200,000 civilians fleeing war.  This 
unintentionally created a legal and political anomaly. Over time, conflicts and crimes rose 
within the sites, and UNMISS improvised a form of administration. But while the 
internationals sought technical solutions, people displaced within the sites turned to familiar 
‘customary’ methods to manage problems of insecurity, establishing chiefs’ courts. The PoC 
sites became an arena of plural authorities, with chiefs working alongside camp 
administrators, peacekeepers and humanitarian actors. We explore how and why the chiefs 
responded to insecurity within the sites and whether they engaged with, or diverged from 
United Nations actors and international norms. We demonstrate that justice remains central 
to the provision of security in contexts of war and displacement. International peace 
interventions are rightly wary of ‘customary’ justice processes that prioritise communities and 
families at the expense of individual rights, but this unique case shows that they are sources 
of trust and consistency that are resilient, adaptable and can contribute to human security.   
A husband accused his wife of adultery in a customary court in a ‘Protection of Civilians’ site 
(PoC) in Juba, South Sudan, in March 2017. His claim was rejected for lack of evidence and the 
chiefs ruled that the woman should move to her family’s house and the couple should ‘receive 
counselling’. But they were not able to enforce this decision. For one thing, the sites were under 
the authority of the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS), a regime which did not 
regard adultery as a crime. For another, UNMISS did not recognise the authority of the chiefs’ 
courts and kept its distance from many of the disputes they tried to reckon with. The chiefs knew 
that interfamilial problems could rapidly become intercommunal ones and erupt into violence in 
the volatile, traumatised setting of the camp. They sought to manage relationships and prevent 
tensions from escalating.  In this case, their judgement was ignored, and interpersonal and self-
inflicted violence ensued. The husband refused to respect the court’s decision and forced the 
wife to return to his home; she later hung herself, committing suicide.1 The case reflects some of 
the grave dilemmas facing local and international authorities concerned with promoting security 
during protracted crises and war. It provides grounds to re-examine the connections between 
justice and security in contexts of war and displacement, and to identify implications for 
international peace missions and humanitarian interventions. 
Situations of protracted violent conflict and crisis are usually defined by the erosion of the rule of 
law and legitimate political authorities. Yet while states are in crisis and international actors have 
intervened to ‘protect civilians’, local authorities may be central to justice and security provision. 
‘Customary’ ideas about security and social accountability flourish even when states or 
international actors promote competing notions of law and morality (Macdonald and Allen 2015; 
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Porter 2015; Weigand 2017). Relatedly, we know that refugee sites tend to be characterized by 
plural jurisdictions and understandings of law. The vulnerability of refugees does not stem their 
demand for justice (Riach and James 2016) and displaced people do not simply accept a state of 
‘legal limbo’ but show ‘agency within the legal field’ (Holzer 2013).   
Southern Sudan has been mired in civil war, mass killings and extensive human rights violations 
for decades.  In 2011, South Sudan gained its independence and UNMISS was authorised to 
‘support the Government in peace consolidation’ including ‘establishing the rule of law, and 
strengthening the security and justice sectors’ (UNMISS n.d.). After war broke out again in 2013, 
the mission remained with a new priority to ‘protect civilians’.  UNMISS responded to the crisis by 
providing temporary asylum within their bases for civilians whose lives were under threat.  
Within a few years, some 200,000 civilians had taken refuge in sites scattered across the country 
(UNMISS, 2016). They fled there to escape targeted killings of civilians, including by government 
forces, as well as to avoid fighting between the SPLA government forces and rebels of the SPLA 
in-Opposition (SPLA-IO). As the war continued, the bases became ‘Protection of Civilians sites’. 
They were transformed into unique humanitarian spaces under UNMISS authority, from which 
warring parties were mostly excluded. Yet the PoCs also reflected in microcosm some elements 
of the insecurity and plural forms of authority and law that prevailed outside their boundaries, 
and UNMISS struggled to maintain control.  
UNMISS set a precedent in international protection by hosting civilians within its bases for several 
years, but it fell far short of fulfilling its protection mandate. The mission barely even attempted to 
protect the majority of civilians who lived outside of the PoCs. It initially pushed back against 
humanitarian initiatives in the PoC, concerned that these would prolong people’s stay, but allowed 
the supply of food, water, medicine and other necessities. It had difficulty excluding small arms and 
former combatants from the sites (CIVIC 2015: 13). It concentrated security provision on maintaining 
a physical barrier to separate those in the PoCs from armed forces outside.  
Tragically, on several occasions, the peacekeepers failed to guard the perimeters of the PoCs 
effectively and to protect residents from attacks. In April 2014, 47 civilians were killed and at least 
100 injured in an attack on Bor PoC (Arenson 2016: 34). In February 2016, UNMISS was accused of a 
‘glaring failure’ to defend people in the Malakal PoC against an attack which left more than 25 dead 
and 120 injured (MSF 2016: 2). In July 2016, 53 South Sudanese civilians were killed and 234 injured 
in attacks upon the Juba PoC sites; a Chinese peacekeeper was killed and hundreds more people 
were raped or murdered in the vicinity of the Juba PoCs (UNMISS & OHCHR 2017: 15-16).  
Meanwhile, UNMISS encountered problems of insecurity and criminality within the PoCs on an 
everyday basis. By September 2015, 2,900 security incidents were recorded (UNSC 2015b). These 
ranged across a wide spectrum from killings, sexual violence, crime and attacks against UN and 
humanitarian personnel and included issues such as inter-communal fighting, theft, gang violence, 
and domestic violence (UNSC 2015a; see also UNMISS HRD 2015: 16). Other disputes between 
individuals, or within families, related to bridewealth, adultery, and minor assaults went unrecorded 
in such reports, but arose on a routine basis, according to our research. Insecurity was rife amid the 
social disruption and uncertainty of displacement.  
UNMISS faced disorder within the camps but it lacked the legal mandate and mechanisms of justice 
to resolve disputes and prosecute crimes. The PoCs were under a quasi-government of the UN and 
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the international regimes of law that it embodied. UNMISS’ powers were constrained by its mandate 
and Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) with the Government of the Republic of South Sudan.  The 
mission was not prepared for an executive policing role, either legally, or in terms of policy and 
resources. It did not have the legal authority required for prosecutions, and the South Sudanese 
state retained sovereignty over the PoCs, even if South Sudanese law could not be enforced within 
the sites without the mission’s consent (Stern 2015: 11). In essence, United Nations Police (UNPOL) 
had responsibility for policing the site, but had neither the mandate, nor adequate personnel to 
police the displaced people, as acknowledged in a review (UNSC 2015: 10).  
Customary chiefs and other community leaders rapidly stepped in to fill gaps in justice and security 
mechanisms within the PoCs. In one sense, this was predictable; customary chiefs and their courts 
have persisted, adapted and governed at local levels amid South Sudan’s previous rounds of conflicts 
and killings (Leonardi 2013). Yet their establishment in the new setting of the PoCs was a natural 
experiment. It allows us to observe the invigoration and construction of chiefly authority, and its 
changes and continuities under a novel form of global governance. It also calls for us to explore the 
divergences and interactions between ‘customary’ notions of security and those promoted by 
international peacekeepers and humanitarians.   
Firstly, we examine the historical significance of chiefs’ courts and how chiefs reproduced their 
authority through the establishment of justice processes within the United Nations sites.  In the 
second part of the article, we discuss UNMISS’ efforts to establish security and the extent to which 
the mission sought to influence customary authority. Finally, we discuss the decisions of chiefs’ 
courts what these reveal about the contributions of the courts to security, and the relations 
between local and international norms and practices of justice.  
Our findings are principally based on records from 395 court cases gathered in the Juba and Bentiu 
PoCs from July 2015-2016, as well as ethnographic research and documentary sources.2 We involved 
a group of paralegals and researchers from the PoC communities as court observers; their concerns 
about insecurity in the sites also informed the research. We analyse the archive of court 
observations and provide selected cases as illustrations.  
During the period examined, the status of chiefly authority in the PoCs remained indeterminate and 
their contribution to security was precarious. The courts and their decisions were not officially 
acknowledged by UNMISS, even if in UNPOL relied upon community actors to help resolve disputes. 
The lack of clarity in relationships between chiefs and other authorities, and the reluctance of 
UNMISS to recognise and actively support the courts, contributed to the more general uncertainties 
of life in the camp. There were opportunities for people to evade the courts and to seek assistance 
from alternative authorities, so chiefs had no guarantee that their decisions would be implemented. 
The courts promoted a conception of a common Nuer identity that in some ways paralleled 
constructs employed by military-political elites to build support for armed opposition. Plus, court 
decisions delivered judgements that routinely undermined the rights of women and youth, 
contradicting international human rights principles that UNMISS aimed to uphold.  
Nevertheless, the chiefs contributed to unifying the dispersed sections of the Nuer within the camp, 
in aid of security. Chiefs’ courts became a popular justice forum within the PoCs. Their dialogical and 
transparent justice processes contributed to binding together the diverse group of displaced people 
and to managing disputes between them. The accessibility and regularity of the court processes 
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were the bedrock of their contributions to security and to chiefly legitimacy. Customary authorities 
held sway, despite the presence of international protection forces.  
There were tensions between international and customary norms of security and justice, and 
between different security providers in the camp, but they shared concerns about insecurity and 
interacted with each other. On occasion, chiefs referenced human rights principles they associated 
with UNMISS in their decisions, paying some attention to international norms. International actors 
also innovated, although their responses were ad hoc and inconsistent. UNPOL supported 
community policing, but did not acknowledge the civil authority of the courts, although this was 
needed to restrain new community police. With no overarching authority and a lack of consistency 
and trust in relations between chiefs and UNMISS, the security situation within the camps was 
unstable. The chiefs’ courts in the PoCs show adaptive responses to the turbulent conditions of war 
and displacement that international interventions must learn from, and find better ways to engage.  
Establishing Chiefly Authority in the PoCs 
The political landscape in South Sudan includes plural or competing public authorities that command 
legitimacy or ‘a minimum of voluntary compliance’, including chiefs, church leaders and militia 
groups.  These everyday political actors should not be underestimated although they do not fit 
standard institutional categories and have a plastic and contingent tendency, remaining unstable 
and constantly in formation (Lund 2006). Public authorities can establish their legitimacy through 
public goods provision (Hoffman and Kirk 2013: 9) including through justice mechanisms. And 
whether they manifest as a ‘protection racket’ or ‘legitimate protector’ (Tilly cited in Kaldor 2014: 
65), or combine elements of both, they are of central relevance to the question of how to establish 
security in protracted conflicts and crises. Chiefs matter politically, both within and outside of the 
PoCs, based on the resilience of their authority historically and its resurgence in this new 
humanitarian setting.  
Chiefly authority in South Sudan 
The political significance of chiefs and their association with government has varied over time and 
space in South Sudan, but chiefs generally cemented their authority by being able to ‘deal’ with 
government, and broker relations between it and ‘home’ communities (Leonardi 2013).  
Governments in South Sudan have co-opted chiefs as part of their local structures of government, 
while chiefs have also made use of governmental power.  The chiefs’ courts were an initiative of the 
Anglo-Egyptian government in the early 20th Century (Johnson 1986); they were formally recognised 
in the 1930s as part of ‘native administration’ and have been used by colonial and post-colonial 
governments since.  The post-2005 Government of South Sudan entrenched customary law and 
chiefly authority in its constitutions.  However, chiefly authority is not simply delegated, but has to 
be won through displaying allegiance to the community and acting as an arbiter of customary law.   
Chiefs’ courts and customary law rely on the fiction of continuity with normative traditions that 
predate colonialism, but have evolved from a complex intermingling of local, national and 
international influences, having been refashioned to satisfy political and social pressures, shifting 
ethical foundations and the demands of daily life.  While many chiefs’ courts claim to apply an 
established set of laws – such as the Wathalel laws amongst the Dinka or the Fangak laws amongst 
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the Nuer – there is variation in their application and judgements also depend upon situational 
interpretations (Leonardi et al 2010: 28).  
Most importantly, chiefs’ courts have been considerable experience of violence prevention. Chiefs 
have used courts to set limits to violence: there is still a ‘strong perception that the courts are the 
principal means of avoiding violent outcomes of disputes’ (Leonardi et al 2010: 30; Santschi 2014: 
49).  People have engaged with courts in pursuit of protection, social regulation and security, even 
when other legal forums are available (such as statutory courts).  In turn, local government 
authorities have held customary courts accountable for insecurity when they fail to settle cases.  
Both historically and in the present, chiefs and their courts have upheld a form of authority 
grounded in civil procedures, against military alternatives. But they have also been implicated in 
violence and human rights abuses. The courts have frequently been responsible for ‘chronic 
miscarriages of justice for violence against women’ (Mennen 2010: 218; Ibreck et al 2017: 10-11).  
Courts in the PoCs 
Local leaders assembled customary chiefs’ courts soon after entering the Juba and Bentiu PoCs and 
they functioned on a routine basis thereafter. Our court reports demonstrate a steady flow of court 
hearings – an estimated average of fifteen hearings per week. They heard cases within a matter of 
days after a complaint was reported. The courts were generally held publicly under a tree by a panel 
ranging from four up to seventeen chiefs, and sometimes including one or two women. The hearings 
often lasted for several hours. As well as the parties to the case and the court panel, there were 
always other residents of the PoCs in attendance, usually more than fifteen, sometimes over fifty. 
The courts collected fees and issue substantial fines and punishments.  Their decisions were taken 
seriously, and usually accepted, by all the parties. The power of customary authority was apparent in 
the payment of court fees that ranged from 100 South Sudanese Pounds (SSP) upwards3 and in the 
acceptance of decisions that included fines and punishments.  
People had the freedom to seek, or comply with, customary prescriptions in the context of the PoCs, 
at least to a greater degree than was possible in any other part of South Sudan. Indeed, they had 
reasons not to attend, since the courts were not officially recognised by UNMISS, while elsewhere 
customary authorities have often been implicitly backed by the force of government.  There was 
some resistance to the voices of custom, especially from youth gangs (Justice Africa 2016: 56). But 
there was also considerable evidence of routine justice-seeking and voluntary compliance with the 
courts.  
Constituting Community 
Chiefly authority relies on a conception of ‘home community’, and the courts were active in making 
this meaningful.  The displaced people were far from being a cohesive group, although the majority 
in both the Juba and Bentiu sites were of Nuer ethnicity.4  Instead, the residents reflected existing 
social cleavages among Nuer people, including differences in regional, clan and section identities, 
and in experiences of wealth, education and urban or rural living.  Residents in the Bentiu PoC sites 
included people who previously lived in urban Bentiu, as well as people who lived abroad and people 
who had previously never left their rural, home village.  In Juba, residents came from across South 
Sudan and included people who came to the capital for a plethora of different reasons, such as 
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education, jobs and refuge. In addition, Nuer people had diverse experiences of government and 
political allegiances.   
Most people in the PoCs had experienced successive traumatic events. In a survey over 95% of 
people reported that a member of their household had been victim of one or more violent crimes, 
most of them conflict related between 2013 and 2015 (Deng and Willems 2016: 3). Families were 
torn apart; they had lost relatives, livelihoods and assets, such as cattle and land due to the war (see 
Deng et al 2015: 16). As people ran to the PoCs, they became detached from former roles and 
relationships. Notions of community and custom were disturbed and had to be constituted within 
the new setting of the camp.   
The processes of identity construction were not confined to the camp but were also being shaped by 
and feeding into wider political processes, including the ambitions of warring parties. Political and 
military leaders deployed ethnic narratives as a strategy to mobilise supporters during war. Their 
task was complicated by historical grievances and bloodshed between Nuer, especially in the 1990s 
(Johnson 2003). The targeting of Nuer civilians during war created a traumatic bond that leaders 
sought to instrumentalise, but divisions emerged and political allegiances were both forged and 
contested by Nuer elites during the war. Notably, while most Nuer elites joined the SPLA-IO, 
members of the Bul Nuer sided with government (Small Arms Survey 2016).  Political competitions 
on the outside contributed to concepts of identity within the sites.    
The chiefs forged unity around the idea of a shared territorial homeland – a ‘Nuerland’.  Chiefs were 
selected to the court to represent a ‘home’ county in the ‘Nuerland’, although the counties were 
politically-unstable administrative units whose boundaries were changed by military and political 
interventions during the conflict. The counties served as an organisational device: by having chiefly 
representatives from each county the courts could claim to represent all the people of the Nuerland.  
But it also reinforced an ideal of a territorially-linked identity associated with the war, and obscured 
the reality that most of the displaced people had fled to the camp from multi-ethnic urban settings, 
not ‘home’ counties. 
Relatedly, the courts were integral to the process of making chiefly authority and legitimacy. The 
status of chief was conferred within the sites, and had to be reinforced there.  The chiefs 
volunteered and were chosen by people from their ‘home’ communities, who were asked to select 
and vote for a chief based on their reputation for honesty, impartiality and trustworthiness (Ibreck 
and Pendle 2016: 24). Some of the chiefs who were appointed had no prior experience of the role.  
They constructed their legitimacy by resolving disputes and nurturing collective identity in the 
courts.  
The courts promoted Nuer unity and constructed the legitimacy of chiefs in the PoC.  They physically 
brought people together on a regular basis, for formal and informal interactions around what it 
means to be a community.  They upheld a notion that all Nuer can receive justice from a common 
court, irrespective of origin or political or economic status. Chiefs narrated customary laws as if they 
were a fixed set of principles that constituted a common Nuer tradition, even though ‘Nuer law’ is 
known to have persistent local variations (Howell 1954; Johnson 1986). In these ways, they 
produced an idea of a shared moral community, contrasting with the realities of historical and 
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recent experiences. Law was conceived as a guide to morality and an expression of continuity with 
an (imagined) peaceful, homogenous past. Still, the authority of the courts remained precarious, 
given the insecurity of their present situation.  
International Justice and Security  
UNMISS had a responsibility to confront the problems of justice and security in the camp, but was 
wary of involving and empowering customary authorities. The mission was expected to conform to 
and promote international human rights norms – these were at the core of its original purpose and 
integral to the practical tasks that it set out to achieve, including the promotion of the rule of law, 
civilian protection and human rights monitoring (UNMISS 2017).  The conceptions of security, law 
and justice espoused by UNMISS contrast with well-known tendencies of chiefs’ courts, such as the 
lack of legal representation, discrimination and violence against women (Mennan 2010).  
Although UNMISS lacked the mandate for executive policing, over time it developed policies aimed 
at improving security in the PoCs, including ‘holding facilities’ and assessments to determine when a 
suspect or offender could be excluded from the camp. But these were limited, bureaucratic 
measures and UN staff themselves expressed concern that their responses failed to meet 
international human rights standards, due to prolonged periods of ‘holding’ suspects and risks 
associated with ‘handovers’ and expulsions (UNSC 2015b: 8; Stern 2015; Justice Africa 2016).  
Unable to resolve the dilemmas of security and justice within the camp independently, UNMISS 
involved community actors in a variety of ways, both formally and informally. Its main contributions 
were to support community-led management structures within the camp, and support for 
community policing.  On paper, the mission recognised ‘traditional leaders’ should be included in 
conflict transformation initiatives – ‘to strengthen their role as arbiters and mediators within 
dialogue processes’ (UNSC 2015b: 10-11), but its interactions with the chiefs were neither coherent 
nor sustained.  
The mission failed to develop clear and effective policies in response to the problem of justice 
provision within the PoCs. At first it encouraged an Informal Mediation and Dispute Resolution 
Mechanism (IMDRM). The IMDRM concept echoed elements of the chiefs’ courts, but its guidelines 
aimed to reduce and limit their powers, including by avoiding sexual or gender-based violence cases 
to avoid breaches of UN standards (Stern 2015: 12). The intention was to mediate and manage 
conflict – to ‘prevent the escalation of and mitigate disputes’5 – rather than to act in a judicial 
capacity, and it was expected to work without issuing fines and punishments. The result was 
opaque, with some PoC residents assuming the IMDRM was the UN name for their chiefs’ courts, 
while UNMISS held back from publicly acknowledging the chiefs’ judicial authority.  
This equivocation was not surprising. UNMISS Human Rights Division was critical of customary courts 
outside the PoCs for acting beyond constitutional limitations during the conflict, and imposing 
cultural norms that violate the rights of women and girls. An investigation concluded that courts are 
‘adjudicating on cases beyond their jurisdiction, violating fair trial standards, and imposing illegal 
fines and sentences in contravention of national laws and international human rights principles’ 
(UNMISS HRD 2015: 30). Humanitarian agencies working in the PoCs also expressed concern about 
the risks of harm from the customary courts – while recognising that they might contribute to 
 8 
violence reduction, they called for monitoring of court decisions to encourage fairness and prevent 
harms (South Sudan Protection Cluster 2014). 
Some compromises and tacit understandings developed. UNPOL did not regulate the daily practices 
of the courts. But the UN police officers could be contacted when complaints arose. They also 
insisted that the chiefs should not have the power to handle the most serious cases involving rape or 
murder, which had to be referred to UNPOL.  
UNPOL made efforts to provide guidance and training to volunteer youths to undertake community 
policing as members of a Community Watch Group (CWG) through occasional workshops. The aim 
was to reduce violence and criminality within the camps in general, but the hope was also that it 
would improve communication between UNPOL and the IDPs. During one such training session, 
UNPOL officers stressed that security for people in the sites required ‘cooperation and coordination’; 
they called on the trainees to help enforce rules and prevent criminal activities, including increasing 
assaults by IDPs upon UNPOL officers (UNPOL 2015).  
The boundaries between UN initiatives and customary authorities were sometimes blurred and the 
representatives of ‘custom’ and their relationship with UNMISS evolved over time. But UNMISS’ 
approach was largely a functional one and privileged policing over judicial mechanisms. Its attempt 
to influence the courts, the IMDRM, exemplified a view that the courts were a potentially useful 
mechanism for dispute resolution – that could be reformed and made to function better; it did not 
reflect a recognition of the courts’ role in constitution of legitimate authority and moral community. 
Actions by the internationals suggested a willingness to explore cooperation, and an implicit reliance 
upon customary authorities; but were neither coherent nor consistent. 
Courts in Practice 
We now turn to an examination of how the courts functioned in practice. The majority of cases 
brought to the courts during the court observation research period (July 2015-2016) related to 
familial matters, including petitions for divorce, and claims of adultery. There were also instances of 
petty crimes, including theft. We focus our analysis on cases relating directly to physical violence and 
insecurity or human rights issues.  
Dealing with Physical Violence  
Chiefs’ courts were proactive in trying to prevent or stem violence. The chiefs recognized that the 
most serious cases could not be dealt with and had to be referred to UNPOL, but they were ready to 
handle a range of accusations relating to beatings, domestic violence and fighting between 
individuals and groups. They also took cases that were brought in fear of future violence. It was 
common for a case to be ‘brought to court in order to prevent a quarrel and avoid the fighting 
between two parties’.  A common reason given for a judgement was ‘to try to avoid a fight and solve 
the case’.  
It is striking how quickly cases that might provoke anger were heard – disputes could be dealt with 
through the courts in days or even hours; they were treated as urgent matters. For instance, a 
seven-year-old child in Juba PoC3 was injured in a traffic accident on 10 October 2015 in the 
evening. The following morning, the motorcyclist accused of the injury was brought to court and the 
parents received a swift settlement and compensation.  
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The courts’ timely responses did not prevent people from raising longstanding grievances. A person 
bringing a case in anger or distress had a good chance that their complaint would be heard at length 
and accepted, even after the passage of time. We see this in a case on 17 November 2015, brought 
by a young woman who accused her neighbour of fighting with her and injuring her baby while she 
was pregnant. Their fight at the water point had occurred nine months previously, and the 
complainant was convinced that it caused the infant’s death. The accused admitted the fight but 
rejected the charges. The complainant did not report the case at the time, and no medical evidence 
was presented, but this did not prevent the chiefs from ruling in her favour and awarding 
compensation of five cows. The crowd was growing restive, ‘security was poor’. The chiefs saw the 
‘need to bring down the tense situation between the two families since the child died.’  
The chiefs strived to prevent people taking matters into their own hands. The risks of intercommunal 
violence were starkly apparent from fighting between hundreds of IDPs, that ended in one death 
and 32 injuries in the Juba PoCs on on 8-11 May 2015 (Arenson 2016: 33). The battle was sparked by 
the discovery that a girl from one section, the Haak Nuer, had been made pregnant out of wedlock 
by the member of another, the Bul Nuer, and that the young man refused to pay customary 
bridewealth. The peacekeepers were unable to halt the clashes which ended only after the chiefs 
mobilised an ‘N4’ community security force, made up of youth members of each of the Nuer 
sections, and brought together parties for mediation.   
The courts were persistently engaged in efforts to limit the ‘cycles of more revenge and counter 
revenge’ that have been a historic feature of conflicts in South Sudan (Jok 2014: 18). A case in Bentiu 
is a direct illustration of this. On 14 June 2016, a young man brought a case to the chiefs’ court in the 
Bentiu PoC against an elderly man who attacked him with a knife. The accused explained that he was 
seeking revenge for the killing of one of his relatives in December 2015 by one of the young man’s 
relatives.  The chiefs responded with strong condemnation: ‘We came here [the PoC] for protection 
and not to kill each other.’ They fined the elderly man three cows and a sentence of imprisonment 
for six months and praised the complainant for bringing the matter to court rather than fighting 
back. Both parties accepted the judgement.  
Many everyday cases of violent assault were also brought to the courts. In these cases, we often see 
reasoning that seeks to answer the harm with compensation and significant efforts to punish 
perpetrators with heavy fines or even prison sentences. A financial settlement was often presented 
as a solution. For instance, on 1 May 2016 a man who admitted to beating another man who had 
‘verbally abused him’ was fined 5500 SSP as ‘medical costs’, although the details of the treatment 
were not specified. In most cases fines were issued, and in some cases punishment was more 
severe.  This could include a sentence of ‘imprisonment’, which had to be improvised as a house 
arrest under the surveillance of the family, chief or CWG.  
The chiefs’ responses to instances of violence seemed to depend largely upon the implications of the 
violence not for the individual victim, but for the community.  In this calculation, the needs of 
vulnerable people could easily be trumped by wider security considerations. Such judgements 
placed chiefs’ courts in contravention of individual human rights norms. The chiefs envisaged an 
ideal of community security, to be established and maintained through peaceful relationships.   
Handling Domestic Issues 
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Chiefs often heard and dismissed accusations of gender-based violence, especially domestic 
violence. Such cases were often brought to court by women seeking a divorce, yet they rarely won. 
Instead, the women’s needs for protection were overlooked in favour of the social and economic 
interests of the husband and family.   
Customary norms consider that when a marriage takes place, the newly-related families have social 
and economic interests in its continuity.  Those who provide cattle to the groom, often including his 
uncles and friends, will expect cattle from his own daughters’ marriages.  The wife’s father will have 
also gained and shared cattle from the marriage, and divorce would demand that these cattle be 
returned. The wife’s needs are subsumed beneath a collection of interests that extend into the 
community.  Chiefs’ courts in the PoCs have generally preferred to uphold marriages to avoid 
complicated divorce settlements and the conflicts that might follow, even if this comes at the cost of 
effectively licensing the husband’s abuse against the wife.  
A typical example was heard in Bentiu PoC on 1 February 2016. A woman opened a case claiming 
that her husband had beaten her.  She had fled her home with her child and gone to her aunt’s 
house within the PoC. Her husband followed her and tried to make her return, but she invoked the 
authority of her father to allow her to stay. The court ruled in favour of the husband and told the 
wife to return to him.  The chiefs stated that: ‘it is normal that two partners can quarrel’.  They took 
time to advise the husband that he should get to know his wife’s father better so that there is no 
quarrel between them.  They also advised the accused man that ‘he must respect his wife and share 
with her a better life, not an unfaithful life’. Both parties and the crowd assented to the ruling.  
Courts prioritised the interests of the husband and the family over the individual security and rights 
of the wife in cases of domestic violence. Divorce could be obtained only if the husband or family 
were willing, and the bride price could be repaid. Chiefs might still condemn the violence, depending 
on its severity. The probable gains for a woman bringing a case of domestic violence were the 
chance to expose the problem and obtain mediation, as chiefs intervened to encourage better 
relations between the couple and their families.  
Court Processes: Creating Security and Trust 
The court hearings promoted a sense of publicity and the idea that when individual and familial 
problems and threats are exposed and shared, then everyone can feel more secure. While dialogue 
was dominated by chiefs, the parties, their relatives and the audience generally were also able to 
participate and voice their views. It was not only that the Nuer community was discursively 
constituted by the chiefs, it was also made real by the people who brought cases to court and 
attended as observers. Social relations and trust were built through the process. 
The courts referred to the individual accused or complainant as a member of a family, binding them 
together. Families were involved in interrogations and received or gave compensation on behalf of a 
family member; they were also treated as offended parties in instances of premarital sex or 
adultery. The chiefs expressed commitments to all who brought cases to the court, whether as 
perpetrator or victim. They recognised their dignity as Nuer people, with a deep social bond – an 
idea that was shattered by the violent disputes, tensions or criminality that brought people to court, 
and had to be repaired through the process. The court panels reinforced this by working together in 
a cooperative manner, supporting each other, even while airing different opinions. Chiefs sat 
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alongside each other in a spirit of firm collaboration.  Through their use and support of the courts, 
people were able to participate in building trust.  
Yet the concepts of social repair and trust advanced by the chiefs were deeply bound up with 
paternalism, as exemplified in a case on 15 July 2015. A 14-year-old girl was brought to court 
accused of having a relationship with a 17-year-old. The boy was asked to marry the girl and she was 
asked to declare her love for him publicly in the court. He refused on the basis that he did not have 
any money to marry, his father was not there and his elder brother was not yet married. A relative 
of the girl became angry, criticising him as ‘from Rubkona, people from there don’t tell the truth’. 
The chiefs intervened with a lesson on Nuer morality. Four of the chiefs spoke, each in similar tones, 
advising the relative not to cause trouble after the matter was settled in court.  They warned the girl 
to ‘learn from the mistake that happened to you’ and to avoid the boy in order to prevent violence: 
‘your brothers will take the law into their hands and beat this man’. Finally, they fined the boy 1500 
SSP and warned him: ‘don’t cause instability and insecurity. Please go peacefully.’ Relatives of the 
parties and the wider community voiced their views and encouragement throughout the process.   
In the above case, and in many others, the question of evidence – of whether the relationship 
between the boy and girl was more than hearsay – was barely investigated. The chiefs and observers 
assumed that person who brought the case had good reason for his suspicions and indeed parties in 
the case often confessed. It was accepted as a matter of unspoken principle that the parties would 
bring a case in good faith, and the chiefs would reach their judgement on the same terms.  
Hybrid Justice and Security Institutions?  
The legitimacy of the chiefs’ courts in the PoCs rested mainly on their relationships to the 
community. Yet they were still concerned to ‘broker’ relations with UNMISS, as the overarching 
authority, in the same way that chiefs have historically negotiated their roles with governments 
(Leonardi 2013). UNMISS’ attempts to engage with the community, through the IMDRM and support 
for community policing, had mixed results. But there is some evidence of adaptations to UN 
authority.   
The Community Watch Groups were the most tangible point of connection between the courts and 
UNPOL. At times, it seems the CWGs collaborated effectively with both the chiefs, and UNPOL 
(UNMISS 2017). But cooperation was undermined by the fact that ongoing support was limited, for 
instance, CWG members pointed out that they lacked basic resources and did not even have a 
supply of notebooks in which to write down complaints they received (interview, Juba PoC3, 15 July 
2015).  
UNPOL’s encouragement of community security actors entailed some risks – a point best illustrated 
by the fate of the N4 in the Juba PoCs. Initially, the N4 was closely linked to customary authority; it 
comprised members from four areas in the Nuerland and had over 250 youth members. On 
occasion, its members were responsible for abuses and were brought to court and disciplined 
(Ibreck and Pendle 2016: 30).  But the group was harnessed by community-led camp management 
structures recognised by UNMISS, and it gained a new name in 2016, the ‘Community Emergency 
Response Team’ (CERT). By 2017 it had merged with the CWG as part of a ‘public order team’ under 
the authority of the camp chairman. Over time new challenges emerged, but UNPOL stopped 
providing them with ‘capacity building’. By May 2017, the security team had become notorious for 
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demanding taxes and issuing threats or administering beatings, as the court observers commented: 
‘The N4 has gone beyond repair. This cannot be solved by training, they are continuing committing 
these beatings. We are receiving women complaining every day… Two women had abortion 
[miscarriage] because of beating’ (group discussion, Juba, 18 May 2017).  
Despite the fact that UNMISS maintained its distance from the courts, the chiefs showed some 
consideration of the mission’s perspective, by paying lip service to international human rights 
norms. On 29 July 2015, in Juba PoC3, a woman brought a case against her husband for divorce, 
accusing him of being abusive and irresponsible for not supporting her. During the trial, all the chiefs 
advised the woman that wife beating was normal because it is a way of ‘disciplining the women in 
our custom as Nuer’. In closing, the head chief declared that the panel had found no proper reason 
for a divorce and that the woman should go back to home to her husband.  But he warned the 
husband of the dangers of physical fighting or beating, and reminded him that human rights abuses 
were not accepted by UNMISS in the PoCs.   
In a few cases, there were more concrete examples of respect for UNPOL. A court report from 7 
September 2015 in Juba PoC3 noted: ‘punishments were not given as UNPOL was present and they 
do not allow beatings or corporal punishments.’ In this case, the Community Watch Group had 
found a group of men who were beating another man ‘almost to the point of death because of a 
misunderstanding.’ The weapons used included knives, sticks and pangas. The case was brought to 
court within hours of the offence and a panel of 11 chiefs settled the matter promptly, issuing a 
series of heavy fines to each of the defendants. 
In contrast, chiefs and affected parties were anxious about the time it took for UNPOL to respond to 
violence, especially in the cases of rape that they had referred directly to the mission. A creative 
response to this problem was apparent in a case in Juba PoC3 in May 2016. The case was brought by 
a middle-aged Nuer woman against a young man, whom she accused of raping her child. She 
brought the case to customary authorities immediately after her discovery of the incident. The court 
swiftly gave its ruling before referring the case to UNMISS. A panel of seventeen judges and more 
than forty people were in attendance. The woman expressed her fear that the harm to her daughter 
was so extensive that it was possible she would die. The defendant admitted responsibility: he 
promised that he would marry the young girl and that would pay ‘everything needed’ to her mother. 
The court rejected this proposal for forced, child marriage and instead decided that the man should 
be sentenced to jail for six years and would pay compensation for treatment of 10,000 SSP and a fine 
of 5000 SSP. The perpetrator handed over 5000 SSP, but complained that he should not face 
imprisonment or the rest of the fines. Witnesses to the proceedings supported the judgement.  
Chiefs improvised in the courts, and norms were evolving and being contested within the PoCs. In a 
case on 3 November 2015, a young woman who accused her husband of beating her spoke out 
against the chiefs for their failure to grant a divorce, and criticised their ‘outdated traditional rules 
that do not respect the rights of women.’ The courts became forums in which residents grappled 
with the competing claims of authority, and views of security and justice, in an unfamiliar 
environment.   
The chiefs’ reasoning was in tension with the norms of international humanitarian ‘protection’. And 
yet the differences were not irreconcilable. The UN protection actors sought connections to 
community actors, and customary courts were attentive to their new context. Some court cases 
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indicate the scope for a dialogue in the interests of protection. In theoretical terms, a blending 
process could be informed by a relational perspective on human security (Held, 2005).  This would 
value relations of care – while acknowledging that they are ‘not always good or pure’ – and treat 
dialogue and ‘moral deliberation’ as central to security (Held 2005: 158), while also challenging 
inequalities and injustices (Robinson 2011: 5).  In practical terms, the chiefs’ courts could, and 
sometimes did, serve as a public space for honest ‘moral deliberation’.  
Conclusion 
After December 2013, thousands of South Sudanese sought security by physically moving to the 
UNMISS PoCs. They gained a form of sanctuary and access to basic humanitarian needs due to the 
military protection of patrolling UN peacekeepers, and the efforts of international humanitarian 
organisations. However, the PoCs remained insecure and unpredictable environments.   
The people in the PoCs sought to address the problems within the sites with their own familiar 
protection strategies. Chiefs’ courts were swiftly established and became one of the key institutions 
of public authority within this unique legal space, under UN governance.  They produced their 
authority through the provision of justice; remaking custom; and fostering a sense of a common 
Nuer community. The courts did not have the jurisdiction to deal with the most severe crimes, but 
were still important in tackling physical violence and pre-emptively dealing with threats of 
widespread insecurity.  They filled a gap in justice and security provision that could not be addressed 
by UNMISS due to legal and resource constraints.  
Close examination of the processes and judgements based on extensive court records suggests that 
the guiding principle in many rulings was the holding together of the moral community of the PoC 
and the promotion of a relationship of trust between its members. The courts did not treat the 
litigants as individuals, but instead as members of a family and community.  Legal consequences 
were generally corporate and reproductive of gender and generational inequalities.  Court rulings 
focused on remaking communities and trust within families, the PoC communities, and the wider 
Nuer community.  
The courts were positioned precariously between the PoC communities and the ‘government’ of 
UNMISS. The chiefs could not fulfil their historical role of brokers on behalf of the community since 
their judicial authority was not recognised, and there was an abiding risk that their decisions could 
be questioned. But the courts continued to operate and to make rulings that contravened 
international norms. From the perspective of the courts, security continued to depend upon 
prioritising the family and community in decisions. UNMISS routinely asserted commitments to 
individual rights and security, but could not respond quickly to uphold their protection. The 
indeterminate and tense relations between customary authority and UNMISS eroded the principle 
upon which the courts operate: that a sense of community and relations of trust are foundational 
for security.  
These experiences in South Sudan provide wider lessons in relation to settlements of displacement, 
refuge and protracted crises around the world, especially when there are plural justice and security 
providers. They affirm that notions of trust, social unity, and ‘social harmony’ (Porter 2017) may be 
dominant in popular understandings of justice and security. They also encourage recognition of the 
role of customary justice processes in the construction of legitimate authorities and the fostering of 
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collective identities and norms. People do not abandon their politics or agency when they flee into 
political exile (Malkki 1996).  
Our findings are relevant to recent recommendations for reforms in peace missions towards greater 
‘engagement’ with communities (HIPPO 2015). The communities that are made real in the courts 
have exclusionary dimensions and implications in the broader political landscape. Their focus on 
maintaining community relations undermines individual human rights, especially the rights of 
women. But this presents a conundrum, since the role of the courts in building a notion of a 
community of trust and legitimate authority is also central to their security function and persistence 
in crisis settings.   
The lessons of the chiefs’ courts in South Sudan are threefold. Firstly, even during a civil war, and 
among displaced people, where security may seem to depend mainly upon the actions of militaries 
and police, justice practices endure and remain essential. People invigorate them both as a 
mechanism to resolve disputes and as a social practice through which they publicly assert their 
dignity and unity as members of communities.  
Secondly, in South Sudan and other countries with long histories of war and political turbulence 
legitimacy can be constructed by providing accessible and predictable forums to resolve conflicts 
(Weigand 2017). The authority and legitimacy of customary chiefs is related to their consistent 
availability, and capacity to achieve fast settlements. The aspiration for continuity is surely part of 
the explanation for the slow penetration of international human rights norms.  
Thirdly, in such settings, the question of security depends less upon empowering a single authority, 
than upon building relations of trust between plural authorities, and ‘custom’ is not averse to 
problem-solving, adaptation or ‘hybridization’ (Lawrence 2017). Therefore, we should consider not 
only whether justice and security providers conform to certain norms, but also whether they are 
prepared to enter into cooperative relationships and dialogues with competing authorities, including 
international peace missions. We should also ask international actors to reflect on their own 
limitations and adopt approaches to human security that are relational (Held 2005) and focus on 
justice (Human Security Group 2016) – these would be more familiar to, and inclusive of, the 
communities they seek to protect.  
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1 This account was recorded during a discussion with four paralegals and a chief who were involved in trying to 
resolve the case (18 May, Juba).  
2 Six researchers in Juba PoC3 documented 338 court cases and two researchers at Bentiu PoC documented 57 
cases from July 2015-2016. Naomi Pendle undertook fieldwork in Bentiu in 2014 and Rachel Ibreck in Juba in 
July 2015, January 2016, May and August 2017. The analysis also draws on Pendle’s doctoral research in the 
western Nuer in 2012-14. More than twenty South Sudanese lawyers, paralegals and activists contributed to 
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the court observation project established by Rachel Ibreck and Alex de Waal at the Justice and Security 
Research programme (JSRP) at LSE and facilitated with the support of Justice Africa. For further detail on the 
methodology see Ibreck and Pendle (2016). 
3 The costs varied and rose with inflation, exceeding 1000 SSP by 2017. The South Sudanese Pound (SSP) lost 
more than half of its value during the court observation research period and one dollar averaged around 18 
SSP on the official exchange rate, but more unofficially. 
4 The ethnic composition of the camps changed in Juba after an upsurge of violence in the capital in July 2016 
and the spread of the war to surrounding areas.  This brought its own set of challenges and alterations in 
chiefs’ courts. For instance, the Shilluk elected their own chief who sometimes sat on court panels. The details 
of these changes are not explored since during the court observation research period (July 2015-2016) the 
Nuer and their courts predominated in both research sites.  
5 As stated on an UNPOL form designed to refer cases to the IMDRM, and given to the Community Watch 
Group in Juba PoC3, 11 January 2016. 
